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Abstract
Four-month-old infants were presented with feeding actions performed in a rational or irrational manner. Infants reacted to
the irrational feeding actions by dilating their pupils, but only in the presence of rich contextual constraints. The study
demonstrates that teleological processes are online at 4 months of age and illustrates the usefulness of pupil dilations as a
measure of social cognitive processes early in infancy.
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Introduction
Humans possess a remarkable range of social cognitive skills
that help them understand the goals and intentions of others.
Some of these abilities manifest themselves early in development.
New-born-infants demonstrate sensitivity to eye contact [1],
emotional expressions in faces [2], and goal directed manual
actions [3]. Three-month-old infants have been demonstrated to
encode action goals [4], evaluate interactions between animated
agents in terms of positive or negative [5], and follow others gaze
direction [6,7]. Other social cognitive abilities have, to date, been
documented from 6 or 6.5 months of age. These abilities include
the tendency to anticipate the goals of others’ actions [8] and to
detect rational goal directed actions [9,10,11]. Rationality is here
referred to as taking the most direct and functional path to the
goal, given environmental constraints. In the current paper, we
focus on the latter of these abilities, more specifically, young
infants’ tendency to react with surprise when actions are being
carried out in an irrational manner.
The first study to demonstrate sensitivity to the rationality of
others’ actions early in development [11] involved habituation of
6.5-month-old infants to a humanwalking around a barrier to reach
a goal. In a subsequent test phase infants were presented with the
same agent walking towards the goal without the barrier. The agent
either walked directly to the goal (rational action) or took the old,
non-linear, path even though a barrier did not block direct access
(irrational action). In response to these events infants looked longer
(dishabituated) when observing the irrational detour action relative
to the rational straight path action. A similar reaction to irrational
detours has been demonstrated at 6.5 months of age when the
actions were performed by a robot [11] and a self-propelled box [9].
The flexibility of these processes, operating during observation of
humans, robots, and moving boxes, suggest that prior experience
with the events being observed is not always required for eliciting
dishabituation to irrational agent-goal interactions.
These studies illustrate that 6.5-month-olds are sensitive to
abstract principles that operate in the social domain. Infants
assume that agents move on rational paths to reach a goal. This
assumption is violated when an agent detours from the most direct
path. When observing such events infants become surprised, as
measured by increased looking times and dishabituation [12]. The
notion that infants process the rationality of perceived events is
captured by the teleological stance perspective; describing how
infants perceive goals and detect irrational or non-functional
events without requiring experience with the actual events being
observed [13].
Similar principles have also been demonstrated using pupil
dilations in both 6 and 12 month old infants. In fact, Gredeba ¨ck
and Melinder [10] assessed infant’s reactions to irrational and
rational feeding actions, using corneal reflection eye tracking. In a
first experiment infants observed one adult feeding another adult
some pieces of banana in an unconstrained context, meaning that no
barriers informed the observer about rationality. This feeding
action could be carried out in a rational manner: the spoon was
moved from a plate to the recipient’s mouth without unnecessary
detours; or an irrational manner: the food was directed toward the
back of the recipients hand prior to being placed in the mouth (i.e.,
the recipient leaned forward and ate from the back of her hand).
In response to seeing the irrational detour (plate-hand-mouth)
infants dilated their pupil. This dilation is seen as a marker of
enhanced focused attention caused by enhanced information
processing load and/or arousal [14,15,16].
In a second experiment the source of this pupil dilation was
further explored in a constrained context. In this context the feeding
action was always directed towards the back of the hand and the
location of a barrier defined the degree of rationality. In one
condition the barrier was placed outside the action space of the
two agents, maintaining the irrational aspect of the feeding action.
In another condition the barrier blocked the direct path to the
mouth while allowing direct access only to the recipient’s hand. In
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recipient’s hand, became more rational, given environmental
constraints. Results were that 6-month-old infants dilated their
pupil more when observing the irrational feeding than during the
more rational feeding. The fact that many of the infants in this
study had not been fed with solid foods (e.g., with a spoon) on a
regular basis suggests that fundamental components of teleological
processes might be activated independently of experience with the
specific actions being observed [10].
The current study asks, for the first time, to what extent
teleological processes are operational in infants below 6 months of
age. In order to answer this question 4-month-old infants were
presented with 4 different conditions, equaling the rational and
irrational conditions of the unconstrained and constrained
contexts used by Gredeba ¨ck and Melinder [10]. Based on the
findings above, we predict that infants will dilate their pupil more
during observation of irrational than rational conditions in both
constrained and unconstrained contexts.
Methods
Participants
Twelve 4-month-old infants (6 girls), mean age 134 days, range
122–154 days, participated in the final sample. One additional boy
(122 days) was excluded due to lack of gaze data. Only two of the
infants had ever been fed with a spoon (once/day for 6 weeks and
twice/day for 2 weeks), none were eating on their own. Most
infants had, however, observed others eat on a regular basis (on
average 1.8 times/day, range 0 to 3 times/day, for the last 2.7
months, range 0 to 4 months).
Stimuli and design
All infants were presented with 4 different conditions in which
one actor (feeder) scoops up a piece of banana from a plate with a
spoon and waits while a second actor (recipient) simultaneously
opens her mouth and moves her hand sideways on a table.
Following the completion of this action the feeder says, ‘‘here it
comes’’ and subsequently moves the spoon across a table to the
recipient (duration of reaching actions range from 760 to 1040 ms)
who eats the piece of banana and return to her original position
(arm is moved back and the mouth is closed). The feeding action is
repeated three times in succession. Each movie (including three
feeding actions) lasted ,50 seconds.
Two of the conditions feature an unconstrained context without
barriers or other obstacles that restrict the action space of the
feeder. During rational feeding within the unconstrained context
the feeder place the piece of banana inside the recipient’s mouth
(rational and unconstrained condition). During irrational feeding within
the unconstrained context the spoon is directed towards the back
of the recipient’s hand. In the latter case the recipient leans
forward and eats the banana off the back of her hand (to ensure an
equal goal state in both conditions) once the feeder’s hand has
been retracted and is resting on the table (irrational and unconstrained
condition).
Two other conditions feature a constrained context in which a
barrier is superimposed onto the irrational and unconstrained
condition described above. Accordingly, the same feeding to the
back of the hand action is displayed, but this time with a barrier
extending from the wall behind the actors. During irrational
feeding the barrier is placed outside the actors reaching space
(irrational and constrained condition). During rational feeding the
barrier is placed in a manner that restricts the feeder’s access to the
recipient’s mouth (rational and constrained condition). Snapshots of the
four conditions are presented in Figure 1.
Procedure
Upon entering the lab parents received a verbal and written
explanation of the study, several verbal questions about their
infant’s prior experience being fed and observing others eat (see
Participants above), after which parents signed a consent form in
accordance with the 1964 declaration of Helsinki. Following a 5-
point calibration procedure infants were presented with 6 movies
from one condition followed by a short break and 6 movies from
another condition. For example, if an infant was initially presented
with 6 movies (each including 3 feeding actions) from the rational
and unconstrained condition the same infant might then be presented
with 6 movies from the irrational and constrained condition. On the
next day the same infants are presented with the remaining
conditions. In the example above this would include 6 movies of
the irrational and unconstrained condition and 6 movies from the rational
Figure 1. Snapshots of the feeding action; bringing food to the recipients hand/mouth. (A). Snapshots of the recipient leaning forward to
eat off the back of her hand (B) in the irrational and constrained condition (upper) and the rational and constrained condition (lower).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026487.g001
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feeding action (3 feeding actions66 movies) from each of the four
conditions, in a counterbalanced order over the two sessions (a
total of 72 feeding actions; 18 feeding action 64 conditions).
Participating families received a gift voucher (,12J) as compen-
sation.
Data reduction
Two time windows were defined anchored around the initiation
of the feeding action (extending the arm with the spoon towards
the recipient). The baseline block covered the 4 seconds prior to
this event and the test block covered the following 4 seconds,
including the reaching action, the contact between the spoon and
the recipient, ending approximately when the hand retracts from
the hand/mouth (see Figure 1).
One participant’s average pupil diameter was substantially
smaller than remaining participants (.3 z-scores); he was removed
from further analysis. For remaining 12 infants data was included
for 98%, 87.5%, 89.6%, 92.7% of trials for irrational and
unconstrained, rational and unconstrained, irrational and con-
strained, and rational and constrained conditions, respectively.
Changes in pupil diameter were estimated by subtracting the
average diameter in the test block from the average diameter in
the baseline block, aggregated over all feeding events included for
each stimulus. Prior to statistical analysis 2 aggregated data points
were replaced (.2.5 z-scores) with group means. Preliminary
analysis did not find any effects of presentation order; data was, as
such, aggregated over trials. Two paired sample t-tests were used.
One examined the extent to which infants dilated their pupil more
during the irrational and unconstrained conditions than the
rational and unconstrained conditions. Another examined the
extent to which pupil dilations were more pronounced during the
irrational and constrained condition relative to the rational and
constrained condition. In addition, single-sample t-tests against
zero were used to investigate if the pupil dilated significantly from
baseline.
Results
Ten out of 12 infants dilated their pupil from baseline to test
block during observation of the irrational and constrained
condition (sign-test p,.05). Only half of the infants dilated their
pupil during observation of the rational and constrained condition
(pupil dilation in 6/12 participants, n.s.). Comparing the rational
and irrational conditions of the constrained condition demon-
strated more pupil dilation during observation of the irrational and
constrained than the rational and constrained condition,
t(11)=2.48, p=.03, d=.89, see Figure 2. Pupil dilations differed
from zero in the irrational and constrained condition, t(11)=3.35,
p,.01, but not during the rational and constrained condition.
At the same time infants did not differentiate the rational and
unconstrained condition from the irrational and unconstrained
condition, t(11)=0.66, p=.52, d=.32. Pupil dilations did not
differ from zero for either the rational and unconstrained or the
irrational and unconstrained conditions.
Discussion
The present study is the first to demonstrate sensitivity to
violations of rationality at 4 months of age. Infants dilated their
pupil when observing one person feeding another by placing food
on the back of her hand, but only when a barrier was present that
did not restrict the feeder’s access to the recipient’s mouth. These
findings support the claim that teleological principles are online by
4 months of age. The early emergence of this ability demonstrates
that young infants are equipped with a large cognitive toolbox that
helps them interpret real world events.
Pupil dilation
Few studies have relied on pupil dilations to investigate the
developing mind, and only two studies [10,17] have applied this
measure to infants’ social cognitive abilities. There have, however,
been some recent reports that relate pupil dilations to face
processing in children with autism [18] and object representations
in infancy [19]. We believe this methodology provides an excellent
supplement to conventional looking time measures, the main
benefits being that reactions are assessed during observation of
single events in real time, not following the completion of a series
of events. This allows numerous data points to be collected in a
short time (each block [4 seconds] includes 200 samples 63
feeding actions 66 movies, equals up to 3600 data points/block
and stimuli) allowing a substantial reduction of noise that facilitates
detection of early developing mental processes.
Currently, our understanding of the relation between pupil
dilation and underlying processes are far from complete. However,
a recent review suggests that changes in arousal or information
processing load lead to alterations in focused attention and time
locked pupil dilations; the connection between altered attention
and pupil diameter mediated by the norepinephrine system and
the locus coreuleus [15].
Before any claims are made about the specific cognitive
processes that might lead to altered states of attention and pupil
dilations it is paramount to control for differences in luminance. In
general, increasing the luminance contracts the pupil whereas
decreasing the luminance dilates the pupil [20]. The goal area
(back of the hand) had a luminance of ,200 fL in the irrational
and unconstrained condition, the irrational and constrained
condition, and the rational and constrained condition. The goal
area in the rational and unconstrained condition was less bright
(mouth ,150 fL hair ,20 fL). A luminance account would, as
such, predict larger dilation to the rational and unconstrained
Figure 2. Average change in pupil size. Measured from baseline to
test block, separate for the rational and irrational conditions of the
unconstrained and constrained contexts. Error bars represent SE and
the horizontal line represent conditions that significantly differ from
each other.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026487.g002
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this prediction does not agree with the results. Of the three
conditions where pupil dilations were observed (on average) the
rational and unconstrained condition demonstrated the smallest
dilation of the pupil.
An alternative luminance account might be that the relative size
of the pupil is influenced by the luminance at the middle of the
screen, where the hand and spoon moves across the table towards
the goal area. Here the biggest difference exists between the two
constrained conditions, due to the different locations of the barrier.
However, as above, the condition in which the shadow of the
barrier makes the path to the goal darker is the condition with the
smallest pupil diameter. In fact, the average response to the
rational and constrained condition was a contraction of the pupil.
Given that luminance most likely cannot account for the current
pattern of pupil dilations we argue that pupil dilations, in the
current study, is driven by alterations in focused attention that
might be influenced by several factors including enhanced
cognitive load, enhanced emotional processing, and reactions
related to violations of rationality principles. Future research is
essential to map out the relationship between changes in pupil
diameter and the cognitive process that give rise to this reaction.
Teleological processes and the four-step action
segmentation model
The current findings suggest that infants already at 4 months of
age are able to interpret other people’s actions as rational or
irrational. These findings bare similarities and differences to prior
studies using the same stimulus material with older infants [10].
Conceptually similar for both studies (the current findings and
[10]) is that infants do not require a learning phase in which agents
act rational prior to being tested on irrational events (as is common
to prior studies of teleological reasoning using habituation
techniques, for example [9], [11]). In Gredeba ¨ck and Melinder
[10] infants were only presented with a single condition and
reactions to seeing irrational social interactions were measured
across infants. In the current study infants were presented with all
conditions in a within-subject design, however, in a counterbal-
anced presentation order without significant learning effects.
Together these studies suggest that infants bring expectations
about how agents should act towards each other to the lab. These
expectations are not dependent on a specific action or social
interaction but rather adaptable to a wide range of social events,
even to events that infants have not encountered before.
If infants do not base their reactions on prior exposure to
irrational feeding events, what makes them react to violations of
rationality in this context? We suggest a four-step action segmentation
model that allows 4-month-old infants to react to irrational social
actions or social interactions without direct experience with the
actions being observed. We suggest that infants are able to (1)
segment perceived social interactions into action units, such as a
reaching action, leaning forward, and eating. (2) At the same time
we suggest that infants are able to detect the overall action goal;
that is to feed the recipient. (3) Encoding individual action units as
they occur might allow infants to evaluate the efficiency of each
action unit against the overarching action goal. In the case of
functional action sequences (for example the rational conditions of
the current experiment) each action unit brings the overall goal
closer to completion. In the case of non-functional action
sequences some action units (in this case bringing the food to
the back of the receiver’s hand) bring the overarching goal further
away from completion (here defined as a spurious action unit). (4)
Detection of spurious action units violate assumptions that action
sequences are carried out in the most functional manner possible
given environmental constraints (as described by the teleological
stance [9]), causing a surprise reaction, enhanced focused
attention, a surge of norepinephrine and dilated pupils [15].
Though speculative, there is evidence suggesting that infants are
able to segment action sequences into action units already at 6
months of age [21], for more studies with 10–11 month olds see
[22,23]. To our knowledge no study has investigated action
segmentation in 4 months olds, opening up for the possibility that
similar processes are available to infants participating in the
current study.
At the same time we know that infants at both 3 and 5 months
of age are able to encode individual action goals [24,25,26]. It is
also clear that older infants are able to incorporate the overall goal
of an observed action sequence into their own behavior. For
example, 14-month-old infants’ ability to anticipate the goal of a
reaching action is dependent on how the goal object is later used
[27]. Whether 4-month-olds are able encode the overarching goal
of an action sequence is less clear.
In order to validate the suggested four-step action segmentation model
it is required that 4-month-old infants are able to evaluate the
efficiency of individual action units against the overarching goal of
the action sequence. Future research is required to assess the
degree to which 4-month-old infants are able to perform the
processes here suggested.
The origins of teleological processes
Regardless of the validity of the proposed model it is clear that
4-month-old infants are sensitive to the rationality of the perceived
social interaction. It is currently unclear if this sensitivity to
irrational events is experience independent in accordance with
core knowledge theory proposed by Spelke [28] or rooted in early
experience with rational action sequences and rational social
interactions in general. In accordance with the latter suggestion, it
is possible that a substantial exposure to a large variety of
functional combinations of action units have resulted in a
generalized expectation that actions are carried out in the most
efficient manner possible, given environmental constraints [29]. In
short, it is unclear at this stage if the demonstrated early sensitivity
to irrational social interactions is innate or based on early
experience with rational actions.
Development of teleological processes
Infants undergo substantial development between 4 and 6
months of age. Six-month-olds are able to react to irrational
actions without the presence of barriers (Experiment 1, [10])
whereas 4-month-olds (in the current study) are only sensitive to
irrational action in the context of a barrier. One interpretation of
this finding might be that the barriers helped conceptualize the
contextual constraints, even when observing unconstrained
feeding to the back of the hand. Phrasing this suggestion in terms
of the four-step action segmentation model postulated above it is
possible that the barrier facilitates the efficiency evaluation of
individual action units with respect to the overarching action goal.
An alternative and perhaps complementary assumption is that
infants simply perceived the back of the hand as a feasible goal in
the unconstrained condition (which is not the case for 6- or 12
month-old infants according to prior findings [10]). If this was the
case infants should not dilate their pupil. It is, as such, an open
question as to what extent the null effect during the unconstrained
context represents a rational assessment based on perceived
immediate goals or an inability to evaluate the efficiency of the
action sequence in the absence of clear visual markers, in this case
the barrier. A comparison with the findings of Gredeba ¨ck and
Melinder [10] demonstrates that 6-month-old infants are able to
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both the constrained and unconstrained context) than 4 month-
olds.
Summary
For now, we argue that the pupil dilations elicited during
observation of irrational social interactions in the current study
represent the earliest markers of teleological processes present in
the literature and that teleological processes, in turn, represent an
early emerging abstract social cognitive mechanism devoted to
comprehending the goals and intentions of others.
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